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The next international version of the System of National Accounts will recommend that 
R&D  (Research  and  Development)  expenditures  be  capitalized  instead  of  being 
immediately expensed as in the present System of National Accounts 1993.  An R&D 
project  creates  a  new  technology,  which  in  principle  does  not  depreciate  like  a 
reproducible asset.  A new technology is however subject to obsolescence, which acts in 
a manner that is somewhat similar to depreciation.  The paper looks at the net benefits of 
an R&D project in the context of a very simple intertemporal general equilibrium model 
and suggests that R&D expenditures be amortized using the matching principle that has 
been developed in the accounting literature to match the fixed costs of a project to a 
stream of future benefits.  Of particular interest is the evaluation of the net benefits of a 
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The present paper looks at some of the accounting problems associated with capitalizing 
R&D  expenditures.    A  highly  simplified  general  equilibrium  approach  is  taken  as 
opposed to the usual partial equilibrium treatments of this topic.  One reason for taking a 
general equilibrium approach is that we can deal with the case of a publicly funded R&D 
project where the results of the project are made freely available to the public. 
 
The basic problem associated with investments in R&D projects is that the expenditures 
required  to  develop  a  new  technology  are  made  now  but  the  benefits  of  the  new 
technology occur in subsequent periods.  But what are the benefits of a new technology?  
From the viewpoint of a firm developing a new technology, the benefits would appear to 
be the discounted stream of (monopoly) profits that the new technology is expected to 
generate.
2  However, it does not seem to be “fair” to charge all of the costs of the project 
to the present period and allow all of the benefits to occur in future periods since the 
income of the firm will be unduly depressed in the present period and unduly exaggerated  
in future periods.  Thus it seems appropriate to amortize the present period expenditures 
on R&D and spread these costs out to future periods so that costs can be better matched 
to benefits period by period.  This is the point of view taken by Diewert (2005b) (2005c). 
 
Note  that  the  amortization  of  R&D  expenditures  over  future  periods  is  conceptually 
different from wear and tear depreciation of a reproducible asset: the R&D expenditures 
are a sunk cost whereas wear and tear depreciation is a result of use of the reproducible 
asset  during  each  period  that  the  asset  can  deliver  services.    Thus  wear  and  tear 
depreciation within a period is a definite phenomenon that depends on use of the asset 
and can in principle be measured, whereas R&D amortization is largely arbitrary and 
depends on whatever accounting principle seems “reasonable” under the circumstances 
that will match costs to benefits in each period. 
 
There are some problems with the above view on how to amortize R&D expenditures: 
 
•  The above approach to measuring the benefits of an R&D project sets the net 
benefits of the project equal to discounted monopoly profits that can be attributed 
to the project less the current period cumulated R&D expenditures.  This view of 
the net benefits of the project is firm oriented and may not capture the social 
benefits of the project. 
•  The above approach totally fails if the R&D project is a government financed 
project where the new technology that results from the project is made freely 
available to the public. 
 
                                                 
2 This is the point of view taken by Pitzer (2004), Diewert (2005b) (2005c) and Copeland, Medeiros and 
Robbins (2007).   3 
Thus there is a need to develop a welfare oriented perspective to evaluate the net benefits 
of an R&D project and this is what is done in the present paper.  However, it must be 
noted that our model is rather crude and only represents a start on modeling the benefits 
of an R&D project. 
 
In section 2, we lay out a simple intertemporal model and consider how the traditional 
growth  accounting  approach  to  R&D  works  in this  highly  simplified framework.   In 
section  3,  we  briefly  explain  the  knowledge  production  function  that  creates  new 
technologies.  Sections 4 and 5 assume that a new process innovation has been created 
and we look at the problems associated with measuring the welfare gains associated with 
the innovation.  Section 4 looks at a publicly funded R&D project while section 5 looks 
at a privately funded R&D project and this is where the interesting accounting problems 
emerge.  Section 6 extends our analysis to a product innovation (rather than a process 
innovation).    Section  7  notes  how  our  initial  general  equilibrium  model  can  be 
generalized to account for obsolescence and section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Disembodied Technical Change and Growth Accounting 
 
In order to highlight the differences between the traditional Solow (1957), Jorgenson and 
Griliches  (1967)  (1972)  growth  accounting  methodology  and  the  R&D  accounting 
methodology that will be developed in this paper, it is useful to review the traditional 





t > 0 and x
t > 0 denote the output produced and input used in period t for t = 
0,1,... and let p
t > 0 and w
t > 0 denote the corresponding output and input prices.  We 
assume that production is subject to constant returns to scale and there is competitive 







t ;                                                                                                 t = 0,1,2, ... . 
 
Assume that the output and input data for periods 0 and 1 can be observed.  Then the 
period 0 and 1 productivity levels, a
0 and a
1, can be defined as the output input ratio in 









1 .  
 
The Total Factor Productivity Growth of the economy going from period 0 to 1, τ
0,1, is 
defined as (one plus) the rate of growth of productivity levels; i.e., we have: 
                                                 
3 Index number complications are not present in this model.  This one output and one input methodology is 
developed in Diewert (1992a), Balk (2003) and Diewert and Nakamura (2003).  For extensions to many 
outputs and inputs, see Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) (1972), Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982), 
Diewert and Morrison (1986), Kohli (1990) and Balk (1998). 
4 Thus period 0 production function is y = a
0x and the period 1 production function is y = a
1x  where y is 















where the last two equalities in (3) follow using (1) and (2).  If  a
1 is greater than a
0 (the 
usual case), then τ
0,1 is greater than one and we say that there has been a (total factor) 
productivity improvement going from period 0 to 1.   
 
The  above  algebra  captures  the  main  aspects  of  TFP  measurement  and  growth 
accounting.  Note that the productivity improvement is not “earned”; it just happens!  
Thus we say that there is disembodied technical progress if τ
0,1 is greater than one. 
 
In  the  following  sections  of  this  paper,  we  are  going  to  relax  the  assumption  of 
disembodied  technical  change  and  we  will  assume  that  productivity  improvements 
require some effort in order to create new technologies.  However, once we recognize that 
technological improvements generally require an investment of effort in a prior period 
before  the  benefits  can  be  realized  in  subsequent  periods,  then  a  simple  two  period 
framework is no longer adequate in order to develop the welfare effects of an effort 
driven innovation.  In order to prepare for this many period modeling effort, it will be 
useful  to  conclude  this  section  with  a  multiple  period  disembodied  technical  change 
model.   
 
Thus let y ≡ [y
0,y
1,y
2,...] be the sequence of expected outputs of the economy for periods 
0, 1, 2, ... .  We assume that all output is consumed in each period (so there are no durable 
outputs  for  simplicity).    We  need  a  Social  Welfare  Function  or  intertemporal  utility 
function, W(y), that will enable us to evaluate the relative worth of different sequences of 
consumption.  We choose the following very simple additively separable SWF to make 
these welfare evaluations: 
 





2 + ...  
 
where r > 0 can be interpreted as a reference real interest rate.
5   
 
Let x
t ≥ 0 be the amount of primary input that is expected to be available for use by the 
production sector of the economy in period t for t = 0,1,2,...,∞.  If the economy has only 
the period 0 technology available for all future periods, then y
t equal to a
0x
t is the output 
that can be expected to be produced in period t and the economy’s expected welfare using 
the period 0 technology will be W













3 + ... 






where the future period discounted input aggregate X
1 is defined as follows: 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, 1/(1+r) can be interpreted as a social discount factor.  We assume that the x
t are bounded 
from above as are the one period technical coefficients a
t that define the period t production functions and 
so when we evaluate W(y) using feasible input vectors and feasible technologies, W(y) is finite using the 








3 + ... . 
 
Now suppose that starting in period 1, the economy has a new constant returns to scale 
technology that is defined by the production function y = a
1x where the new output input 
coefficient a
1 is strictly greater than a
0.  Then if we use this new technology in period 1 
and subsequent periods, the new level of expected social welfare that can be attained 
using the new technology is W













3 + ... 




1                                                                              using definition (6). 
 
Using the above definitions, we can calculate a benefit measure B which reflects the 
expected increase in discounted real consumption due to the disembodied productivity 
improvement going from the period 0 technology (represented by a
0) to the period 1 
technology (represented by a
1 which is assumed to be greater than a
0): 
 
(8) B ≡ W
1 − W
0 








1]                                                          using (5) and (7) 





Recall  that  τ
0,1  equal  to  a
1/a
0  is  a  traditional  ratio  type  measure  of  a  productivity 
improvement  whereas  a
1  −  a
0  is  a  difference  type  measure  of  a  productivity 
improvement.
6  We shall find that when we study the welfare effects of an R&D project, 
the difference approach is much more convenient. 
  
The above disembodied model of technical progress assumed that the new technology 
dropped from heaven without requiring any sacrifices on the part of households and firms 
to create the new technology.  In the following section, we will relax this assumption. 
 
3. The New Technologies Production Function        
 
We now recognize that in many cases, the creation of a new process technology cannot 
be done without the expenditure of some effort.  Thus from the perspective of creating a 
new technology in period 0, we could think of a period 0 process innovation production 
function f






where z ≥ 0 is the expenditure in period 0 that is required to produce a new technology 
characterized by the output input coefficient a
1.  We assume that f
0(0) = a
0 so if we 
expend no effort, we end up getting the same old period 0 technology, a
0, that we already 
                                                 
6 The  difference  approach  to  productivity  measurement  is  pursued  by  Balk  (2007)  and  Diewert  and 
Mizobuchi (2007) while the difference  approach  to  the measurement of welfare change  is pursued by 
Chambers (2001), Balk, Färe and Grosskopf (2004), Diewert (2005), Diewert and Fox (2005) and Fox 
(2006).   6 
have access to.  We also assume that f
0 is nondecreasing (so that increased effort inputs 
cannot create worse technologies than we already have in period 0) and concave (so that 
there are constant or diminishing returns to scale in the creation of new technologies). 
 
From the viewpoint of a central planner in period 0 who needs to decide how much of 
society’s period 0 input x
0 should be allocated to the creation of new technologies, the 
following social welfare maximization problem seems to be relevant: 
 
(10) max z {a
0(x
0 − z) + f
0(z)X
1 : 0 ≤ z ≤ x
0}. 
 
Thus  increased  investments  in  R&D  (i.e.,  bigger  levels  of  z)  lead  to  lower  period  0 
consumption,  a
0(x
0  −  z),  but  the  efficiency  of  the  economy  in  subsequent  periods  is 
increased: a
1 = f
0(z) is generally bigger than a
0 so that discounted future consumption, 
f
0(z)X
1, is generally bigger than a
0X
1, which is discounted future consumption using the 
old  technology.    Thus  the  diminished  period  0  consumption  is  offset  by  increased 
consumption  in  subsequent  periods  and  the  z
0  which  solves  (10)  balances  these  two 
effects.  If z
0 is close to 0, there is no problem with this setup but if z
0 is equal to x
0 or is 
close  to  x
0  (so  that  it  is  enormously  productive  to  invest  in  the  creation  of  new 
technologies),  then  the  maximization  problem  (10)  is  not  reasonable  from  a  practical 
point of view since the solution leads to starvation of the populace in period 0!  Thus in 
this case, the upper bound to z in (10) will have to be reduced. 
 
In the sections which follow, we will not assume that investment in new technologies is 
necessarily “optimal” in the sense that z
0 solves (10).  We will simply assume that the 
government or private sector investors allocate the amount z
0 of input in period 0 to 








It would be of some interest to investigate the “exogenous” determinants of the period 0 
technology creation function f
0(z); i.e., this function will in general depend on the level of 
education in the economy under consideration, on the stocks of domestic “knowledge” 
that exist in period 0, on the access to the stocks of foreign “knowledge” and many other 
factors.  However, this is not the focus of the present paper which has much narrower 
accounting goals in mind.
7 
 
In the following section, we will look at the effects of a government R&D project and in 
section 5, we will turn our attention to private sector R&D projects. 
 
4. R&D and Process Innovation: The Case of a Government Funded Project 
 
It turns out that the analysis of a government funded R&D project cannot be analyzed as 
a single case: we need to consider various alternative ways of financing the government 
R&D project.  We will consider four different cases in this section.  Privately funded 
projects will be considered in the following section. 
 
                                                 
7 There is a huge literature on endogenous growth models that looks at these questions; see Aghion and 
Howitt (1998) and Aghion and Durlauf (2005) for a sample of this literature.   7 
Case 1: The Centrally Planned Economy 
 
We first consider the case of a centrally planned economy since this is the easiest (and 
least relevant) case to consider.  We suppose that the central planner allocates z
0 units of 
input to the creation of new technologies in period 0 where 0 < z
0 < x
0.  This investment 
creates a new production function with output input coefficient a
1 > a
0.  The resulting 
value of expected discounted consumption is W














3 + ... 





1                                                                  using definition (6) 




1 was the value of discounted consumption defined by (7) which assumed that 
the creation of the new technology was costless.  Thus the present model is more realistic 
in assuming that technology creation is not generally costless. 
 
Of course, we can now define a new net benefit measure B
* associated with the costs and 
benefits of the creation of the new technology: 














1]                                           using (5) and (11) 










            = B 
 
where the costless measure of benefit B was defined by (8).  Thus not surprisingly, our 
new measure of the net benefits of a government investment in the creation of a new 
technology, B
*, is less than our section 2 estimates of a disembodied (or costless) creation 




1 is greater than a
0, it may be the case that B
* is negative if the fixed costs of 
creating  the  new  technology,  a
0z
0,  are  sufficiently  large.
9   In  what  follows,  we  will 
neglect  the  case  of  such  an  impoverishing  investment  and  we  will  assume  that  a
1  is 
greater than a










0 > 0 
 
so that the R&D project generates an increase in discounted real consumption.
10  
 
                                                 
8 If  our  present  (costly)  model  of  technical  progress  is  correct,  then  assuming  incorrectly  that  the 
disembodied technical change model presented in section 2 is correct will not surprisingly generate errors.  











0.  Thus the disembodied model would incorrectly assume that the 
productivity growth rate going from period 0 to 1 was a
1/a
0* which is greater than the actual rate a
1/a
0.   
9 See Romer (1994) for a good discussion of this point in a slightly different context. 
10 We will assume that (13) holds also for the case of a private R&D project.   8 
We now turn our attention to the case of a market economy where the government has to 
raise the revenue required to fund the R&D project by taxing households. 
 
Case 2: An Income Tax for Period 0. 
 
We now have to specify what is happening to prices in the economy in each period.  We 
will  assume  that  there  is  a  central  bank  in  the  background  that  acts  to  stabilize  the 
producer price of output in each period so that p
t is expected to equal 1 in each period.  In 
period 0, primary inputs x
t are paid the value of what they produce (before any income 
taxes) so that w
0 is equal to a
0 in period 0 and w
t is equal to a




0 in period 0 and y
t equals a
1x
t in subsequent periods.  It is convenient to list 
these assumptions since we will draw on them in the cases to be developed later: 
 
(14) Period 0: p





0 ; Period t: p





t for t ≥ 1. 
 
The primary input prices w
t defined above are producer prices and are before any income 
taxes.  We now assume that the government imposes an income tax in period 0 in order to 
finance the R&D investment.  The size of the income tax, t
0, that is required to balance 







Thus primary input suppliers in period 0 face the after tax wage rate of w
0(1−t
0) so that 























0] is period 0 consumption (recall that p
0 = 1).  The value of expected 
discounted consumption is still W
1* defined by (11) and the net benefit associated with 
the R&D project is still B
* defined by (12).  Thus there is no problem in attaining the 
planned economy level of welfare using an income tax in period 0 to finance the project 
in a decentralized market economy. 
 
Case 3: A Consumption Tax for Period 0. 
 
Again, we assume that expected producer output and input prices are defined by (14).  
However, in this case, instead of assuming that the government imposes an income tax in 
period  0  in  order  to finance  the  R&D  investment,  we  now  assume  that it  imposes  a 
consumption tax.  The size of the consumption tax, t
0*, that is required to balance the 










0 was the income tax defined by (15).  In this case, households in period 0 have 
primary  factor  income  equal  to  w
0x
0  to  spend  on  consumption  which  is  priced  at 
p
0(1+t
0*).  Thus the period 0 household expenditure equals income equation is:   9 
 



















0                                                                       using (17) 
. 
 
But  the  last  equation  in  (18)  is  equivalent  to  (16).    Again,  the  value  of  expected 
discounted consumption is W
1* defined by (11) and the net benefit associated with the 
R&D project is still B
* defined by (12).  Thus there is no problem in attaining the planned 




Case 4: Financing the Project by Foreign Borrowing 
 
In the previous 3 cases, households who are alive in period 0 bear all of the burden of 
financing the government R&D project whereas subsequent generations get all of the 
benefits of the project without suffering any of the costs.  Since we did not allow for 
durables in our model (or any other form of saving) and since we assumed that primary 
inputs  were  supplied  inelastically  in  each  period,  we  were  unable  to  avoid  this 
asymmetric bearing of the burden problem.  We now relax our previous assumptions and 
assume that the government can borrow from abroad if it wishes to do so (at the same 
real interest rate r that appeared in our intertemporal utility function W(y) defined by (4) 
above).  Thus we now assume that the government faces the following intertemporal 







−2 + ... = 0 
 
where b
t is the period t export (if b
t is positive) or import (if b
t is negative) of output for 
the economy in period t.  Thus suppose the government imports the output commodity in 
period 0 so that b
0 is negative (and we can regard −b
0 as a capital import) and then repays 
the  loan  in  the  following  period.    Since  capital  made  available  in  period  0  is  more 
valuable in period 0 than in period 1, if the government repays the loan in period 1, then 
the government must export b
1 equal to (1+r)(−b
0) in order to repay the loan. 
 
We will assume that the government borrows an amount in period 0 that is just sufficient 
to  maintain  the  consumption  level  that  would  have  resulted  if  the  government  R&D 
project were not implemented.  Thus b







When we substitute (20) into the intertemporal balance of payments constraint (19), we 
could pick any pattern of future period b
t which satisfy the constraint; i.e., the repayment 
plan has many degrees of freedom.  But fairness and ability to pay considerations might 
                                                 
11 Our model is too simple to record any difference in social welfare due to the imposition of a consumption 
tax versus an income tax.  Of course, in more complex real life economies, there would be differences 
between the two methods for financing the government R&D project.   10 
suggest that the burdens imposed by the loan repayment be proportional to the future 
period consumption levels.  Consumption in period t before the imposition of any taxes 
will be equal to production y
t which is equal to a
1x
t for t ≥ 1.  Thus we let period t exports 
b







t ;  t ≥ 1. 
 









               = fa
1X
1                                                                                     using definition (6).  
 
Solving (22) for f gives us:  
    














t                                                                                                       for t ≥ 1 ; 






1]                                                                                      using (24)                                          

















−2 + ... 










−t                                          using (25) 






0]                                                                         using (6) 






                 = W
1*                                                                                                   using (11). 
 
Thus under this borrowing from abroad financing scheme for the government funded 
R&D project, we attain the same level of net benefit, B
* defined by (13), as was obtained 
in cases 1-3.  However, the present scheme will be intertemporally much more equitable 




In order to implement the above equilibrium in a decentralized fashion, the government 
need  only  impose  an  income  tax  at  the  rate  f    defined  by  (23)  for  periods  t  ≥  1.  
Alternatively,  the  government  could  implement the  above  equilibrium  by  imposing  a 
consumption tax for periods t ≥ 1 at the rate t
* defined as follows: 
 
                                                 
12 We will obtain the same c
t solution as is given by (25) if we make period t loan repayments proportional 
to the incremental consumption that is made possible by the innovation; i.e., we obtain the same pattern of 




t for  t ≥ 1. 
13 In  order  to  ensure  that  future  consumption  with  the  loan  repayment  is  greater  than  preproject 
consumption, we require that a
1/a
0 > 1 + z
0/X
1 and this inequality is equivalent to (13).   11 
(27) t
* ≡ (1−f)
−1 − 1 
 
where f is defined by (23). 
 
We now turn our attention to privately funded projects. 
 
5. R&D and Process Innovation: The Case of a Privately Funded Project 
                                                                     
Case 5: A Domestically Funded Project with No Outsourcing of Production 
 
In this case, we assume that domestic investors forego consumption in period 0 in order 
to finance the R&D project and in return, these investors will get a stream of monopoly 
profits which they can spend on consumption in subsequent periods.  The characteristics 
of the R&D project are the same as was the case in the previous section: the project uses 
up  z
0  units  of  primary  input  in  period  0  and  it  produces  a  new  technology  which  is 
characterized  by  the  output  input  coefficient,  a
1,  where  a
1  is  strictly  larger  than  the 
preproject technical coefficient, a
0.  We will assume that this project is successful so that 
the inequality (13) is satisfied.  In period 0, we assume that prices and quantities satisfy 
(14).  In subsequent periods, we assume that the new technology immediately displaces 
the old technology and the monopolist produces output using the new technology.  We 
assume that outputs and inputs, y
t and x
t, and the corresponding producer prices, p
t and 
w
t, satisfy assumptions (14).  Producer prices are equal to final demand prices in period 0 
but in subsequent periods, final demand output prices differ from the producer output 
prices  described  in  (14)  because  the  owners  of  the  new  technology  can  charge  a 
monopolistic markup, m say, on the sales of the output.
14  Thus for periods t ≥ 1, the 
owners  charge  households  the  final  demand  price,  p
t(1+m)  =  (1+m),  instead  of  the 
producer price, p
t = 1.
15  We now have to determine the size of the markup. 
 
After the introduction of the new technology, real wages will increase from w
0 equal to a
0 
to w
t equal to a
1 for t ≥ 1.  In order to produce one unit of output in period t ≥ 1 using the 
old  technology,  an  amount  of  input  equal  to  1/a
0  would  have  to  be  used  since  the 
equation: 
 




has the solution x
* equals 1/a
0.  Thus potential competitors (using the old technology) to 
the monopolist would sell units of output at the period t price p
t* defined as follows in 










t = (1+m) ;                                                 t ≥ 1. 
 
Thus the owners of the new technology can charge (in the limit) a monopolistic markup 
m defined as 
                                                 
14 Thus  we  are  assuming  that  the  new  technology  is  proprietary  and  is  not  made  available  to  other 
producers.  
15 Recall that we are assuming that the central bank stabilizes the producer price of output in each period.   12 
 
(30) m ≡ (a
1/a
0) − 1. 
 
Thus if the owners of the project fully exploit their monopoly position, households will 
have to pay the final demand prices p
t* defined by (29) for t ≥ 1.   
 
With the above preliminaries out of the way, we can now look at the streams of factor 
incomes and expenditures at final demand prices and see if income equals expenditure in 
each  period.    The  period  by  period  sequence  of  consumption  quantities,  c










t , t ≥ 1. 
 










t , t ≥ 1. 
 
Turning  our  attention  to  the  quantities  and  values  of  inputs,  the  sequence  of  input 
quantities is the usual x











t , t ≥ 1. 
 
However, primary input income does not exhaust income because for periods later than 0, 
there will be some monopoly profits that will be distributed back to the investors in the 
R&D project.  This stream of monopoly profits is given by: 
 





t , t ≥ 1. 
 
Comparing the stream of household expenditures given by (32) with the sum of the two 
income streams defined by (33) and (34), it can be seen that total income from all sources 
will  be  equal  to  household  consumption  expenditures  at  final  demand  prices  for  all 
periods except for period 0.  Thus for the periods beyond period 0, this monopoly model 
is  perfectly  consistent.    However,  in  period  0,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  value  of 
consumption  is  p
0c
0  equal  to  a
0(x
0−z
0),  which  is  less  than  the  corresponding  factor 
income, w
0x
0 equal to a
0x
0.  The problem is that we have not accounted for the period 0 
investment in developing the new technology.  This investment is equal to z
0 units of 
input.  We could revalue this input measure of investment into units of output that are 
foregone and thus we define the period 0 investment I







It can be seen that if we add period 0 investment I
0 to period 0 consumption c
0, then the 
period 0 value of outputs will equal the value of period 0 primary inputs. 
   13 









−2 + ... 







−t                                                            using (31) 





1                                                                                using (6) 
                 = W
1*                                                                                                   using (11). 
 
Thus somewhat surprisingly, the level of social welfare that is attained by this private 
sector model of R&D investment, W
1***, is exactly equal to the level of social welfare 
W
1*  that  was  attained  in  the  previous  section  with  the  various  government financing 
schemes.  Thus for this private sector financing model, we attain the same level of net 
benefit, B
* defined by (13), as was obtained in Cases 1-4.  However, at this point, we 
again  must  point  to  the  inadequacies  of  our  social  welfare  function,  which  does  not 
distinguish between households who invest in the project and those who do not invest.  A 
more  adequate  social  welfare  function  would  take  into  account  the increased  income 
inequality between households that results from the monopoly profit stream and the fact 
that some households invested in the R&D project and some did not. 
 
Our measurement problems are not quite over yet.  We need to discuss the accounting 
problems that are associated with this privately funded R&D project.  For accounting 
purposes, it is useful to break up the activities of the R&D project into two divisions: 
 
•  A production division which oversees the production of the output using the new 
technology and  
•  An R&D management division which finances the expenditures for the project 
and collects the monopoly revenues from consumers. 
 
The accounting for the production division is straightforward and need not be analyzed in 
detail here.  The accounting problems associated with management division are much 
more interesting and will be discussed in more detail.  The sequence of costs (in period 0) 
and revenues (in subsequent periods) associated with the R&D management division is 
the following one: 
 
(37)  − w
0z






t , t ≥ 1. 
 
The  problem  with  the  above  sequence  of  net  revenues  earned  by  the  management 
division is that all of the costs occur in the first period and all of the benefits occur in 
subsequent periods.  Thus if we look at the net income earned by the division in any 
given period, it will not be “representative” for the project as a whole: the period 0 costs 
are  not  matched  up  with  the  period  t  revenues.    Thus  in  order  to  construct  more 
representative  estimates  of  income  for  the  management  division,  accountants  have 
invented the matching principle for allocating costs that occur in period 0 but whose   14 
benefits occur in later periods.
16  The basic idea can be explained as follows.  Let {d
t: t = 









−3 + ... = 0. 
 
If we add the period t imputation d
t to the period t net revenues of the division for each t, 
and  then  take  the  present  value  of  the  above  imputed  net  revenues  to  the  actual  net 
revenues of the firm, then the present value of the total revenue stream (including actual 
and imputed net revenues) will of course be equal to the present value of the actual net 
revenue stream.  Thus we will attempt to choose a sequence of imputations d
t that will 
result in more representative period by period net revenues; i.e., the resulting stream of 
period  by  period  net  revenues  will  better  match  the  fixed  costs  of  period  0  to  the 
monopoly revenues that occur in subsequent periods. 
 
We now proceed to an explicit application of the above “matching” model.  In period 0, 
we create an imputed investment output d










We need to choose a sequence of cost allocations d
t for t ≥ 1 which will satisfy equation 
(38)  when  we  substitute  (39)  into  (38).    We  will  choose  to  make  the  period  t  cost 
allocation, d
t, proportional to the period t monopoly revenue, mc
t.  Letting f be the factor 
of proportionality so that d
t equals fmc











−3 + ...  






−3 + ... } 
                 = f ma
1X
1                                                                                 using (6) and (31). 
 
Thus f is equal to: 
 





        
and the sequence of period t cost allocations d
t is given by  
 
(42) d
t ≡ f mc
t                                                                                          t ≥ 1 






t]                                                               using (31) and (41) 






Thus period t net income n
t for the management division is equal to actual net income 
plus imputed net income in period t, d
t, which is actually an imputed cost for period t ≥ 1; 
i.e., we have the following sequence of net incomes for the management division of the 
monopolist: 
                                                 
16 For references to the accounting literature on the matching principle, see Diewert (2005c).   15 
 
(43) n




t                                                                                    t = 1,2, ... 






1]                                                                   using (31) and (42) 













t                                                  using (30) 
           > 0 
 
where the above inequality follows from [(a
1/a
0) − 1] > (z
0/X





The point of all of these imputations is that the cost of the R&D research made in period 
0 is now spread out over future periods, reducing the gross monopoly profits in period t 
of mc
t by the amount −d




1] and the period 0 original negative income 
for  the  R&D  management  division  of  −  a
0z
0  is  increased  to  the  zero  level;  i.e.,  the 
original fixed  costs  of  the  R&D  project  are  intertemporally  reallocated  to  subsequent 
periods in a way which matches costs to revenues in a “reasonable” manner.  It is evident 
that d
t could be interpreted as a period t depreciation allowance but it is more properly 
interpreted  as  an  amortization  amount;  it  is  simply  an  imputation  that  somewhat 
arbitrarily allocates the period 0 fixed cost to future periods.  Note that the absolute value 
of d
t is equal to the product of a
0z
0 (the fixed cost that is to be amortized over future 
periods) times x
t divided by the future input aggregate X






t = 1. 
 
Equations (42) and (45) mean that the sum of the amortization amounts, ∑t=1
∞ (−d
t), will 
exceed the original period 0 R&D costs, a
0z
0, due to the discounting by the interest rate.
17  
                                                             
It can be seen that accounting for R&D leads to an accounting framework which is, 
unfortunately,  much  more  complex  than  the  usual  Solow-Jorgenson-Griliches  growth 
accounting framework! 
 
Case 6:  A Domestically Funded Project with No Outsourcing of Production and with 
Foreign Financing of the Project 
 
Domestic investors could decide to fund the R&D project by borrowing from abroad.  
Thus in this case, we will assume that domestic investors finance the period 0 costs of the 
R&D project by borrowing an amount of the consumption good that is equal to the period 
0 consumption that is foregone by investing in the R&D project; this amount is a
0z
0, 
which we set equal to −b
0; i.e., we define b
0 by (20) as in Case 4 where we considered the 
case of a government R&D project which was financed by foreign borrowing.  As in our 
analysis of Case 4, we assume that the private investors in the R&D project face the 
intertemporal balance of payments constraint (19), where b
t for t ≥ 1 is the amount of the 
                                                 
17 See section 11 in Diewert (2005b) and Diewert (2005c) for examples of how the matching methodology 
works.   16 
consumption good which must be exported in period t in order to repay the loan.  As in 
Case 4, the R&D investors could pick any pattern of future period b
t which satisfy the 
constraint (19); i.e., the repayment plan has many degrees of freedom.  But following the 
logic  of  the  matching  approach  to  the  problem  of  amortizing  the  loan,  it  seems 
appropriate  to  make  future  period  loan  repayments  proportional  to  the  expected  net 
benefit that the R&D project generates in period t, which is the amount of monopoly 
profits equal to ma
1x
t for  t ≥ 1.  Thus b
t is defined as: 
 
(46) b










t ;                                                            t ≥ 1 
 
where f is a parameter to be determined.  Substituting (46) into the intertemporal balance 
of payments equation (19) with b















t                                              using (46) 





1                                                                using definition (6).  
 
Solving (47) for f gives us:  
    

















1                                                                                                   for t ≥ 1.  
 




t for t ≥ 1, and then (26) can be used to define the economy’s social 
welfare under this method for financing the project.  Not surprisingly, we obtain the same 
level of social welfare that we have obtained in all of our previous cases. 
 
We now calculate the period t monopoly revenue, ma
1x













1                                                       using (49) for t ≥ 1 








1                                     using definition (30) 
                         = n
t                                                                                using (44) 
 
where  n
t  was  previously  defined  to  be  equal  to  the  imputed  net  income  of  the 
management division of the monopolist.  Thus in the present case where the R&D project 
is financed by a loan from abroad, our old imputed net income in period t is equal to 
                                                 
18 We get the same answer for b
t if we note that the net social benefit of the project in period t is the extra 
production that the project makes possible which is [a
1 − a
0]x
t and so we could set b
t to be proportional to 




t and then solve equation (47) for f, etc.  However, there is no 
reason for a monopolist to make cost allocations or loan repayments based on a consideration of social 
benefits.   17 
actual monopoly revenue less actual loan repayments in period t.  Thus the net income 
that accrues to the management division is no longer an imputed accounting income; in 
the present case, it is an actual income.  This equality helps to justify the case for the 
imputed income concept that we developed in the previous case.  However, note that for 
both the present case and the previous case, there are ambiguities in our estimates of 
period by period income; i.e., in Case 5, we had to decide how the fixed cost should be 
matched to future revenues and in Case 6, we had to decide exactly how the loan from 
abroad should be repaid. 
                       
Cases  7  and  8:  A  Domestically  Funded  Project  with  Licensing  of  Production  (with 
domestic funding of the project or foreign borrowing to fund the project) 
 
The setup here is exactly the same as in the previous two cases, except that now we 
assume that the developers of the new process license the technology to other producers.  
If we assume that the license fees are proportional to the quantity of output produced by 
the new technology, then no new algebra needs to be developed: simply reinterpret the 
monopoly markup m in the previous case as the per unit output royalty that must be paid 
by independent producers for the right to use the new technology.  Thus the welfare 
effects for these cases are exactly the same as in Cases 5 and 6.  However, note that the 
accounting is slightly different in these licensing cases: we require a slightly augmented 
set of production accounts so that the flows generated by these royalty payments can be 
accommodated. 
 
Case 9: A Foreign Funded Project   
 
In this case, foreign investors fund the period 0 expenditures on primary inputs, w
0z
0, in 
return for the stream of monopoly profits or licensing fees generated by the R&D project.  
In this case, the welfare effects of the R&D project are (finally!) different: the foreign 
investors will get all of the benefits of the R&D  project, leaving domestic residents no 
better off than they would be if the project never took place.  We leave the details to the 
reader. 
 
This  completes  our  discussion  of  a  publicly  or  privately  funded  R&D  project  that 
develops a new process.  In the following section, we turn our attention to R&D projects 
that develop a new product as opposed to a new process.  
 
6. R&D and Product Innovation 
 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to develop any new algebra for the case of a product 
innovation.  We can adapt the analysis in the previous two sections very easily under two 
alternative sets of assumptions concerning the new product: 
 
•  The new product is simply a new mixture of characteristics that purchasers value 
and a hedonic regression methodology can be used to quality adjust a unit of the 
new product into an equivalent number of units of the existing product that is 
displaced.  Once this has been done, then we look at the input requirements for   18 
producing one constant quality unit of the new and old products and this will give 
us the output input coefficients, a
0 and a
1, for producing units of the old and new 
products.  The rest of the analysis proceeds as in sections 5 and 6. 
•  The new product has one or more really new characteristics so hedonic regression 
techniques may be problematic in this case, we may be forced to rely on the 
methodology developed by Hicks (1940) to value the contribution of new goods, 
except that we make the further restriction that the preferences of households over 
combinations of new and old products are linear.  Thus we assume that one unit of 
primary  input  produces  an  amount  of  the  “old”  commodity  which  consumers 
value  at  v
0  and  one  unit  of  primary  input  produces  an  amount  of  the  “new” 
commodity which consumers value at v
1 > v





and we can use the analysis developed in the previous sections. 
 
It should be noted that our analysis is not entirely satisfactory; i.e., in general, we have 
not modeled substitution effects in an adequate manner.  On the production side of our 
model, we have essentially assumed Leontief no substitution type technologies in each 
period and on the consumer side of our model, we have assumed linear intertemporal 
preferences, which imply perfect substitutability between consumption at different points 
in time.  Obviously, it would be desirable to relax these rather restrictive assumptions.  
However,  the  reader  will  have  noted  that  even  with  our  simplifying  assumptions, 
accounting for R&D investments is rather complex. 
 
7. Towards a More Realistic Model of R&D Investment 
 
Another problem with our modeling of an R&D investment is that we have aggregated 
outputs into a single commodity and the R&D investment leads to a new technology 
which entirely displaces the old technology.  This is obviously unrealistic.  Thus in this 
section, we  will develop a more realistic model of an R&D investment.  In this new 
model, we will still have only one aggregate input but now we distinguish two outputs: 
 
•  Output 1 is general consumption and the technology that produces this output 
is unaffected by the R&D investment and  
•  Output 2 is a specific commodity where the R&D investment generates a new 
technology that can produce this specific commodity more efficiently.  This 
second commodity will typically make up only a small fraction of the entire 
economy. 
 
Since  we  now  have  two  outputs,  our  old  single  output  social  welfare  function,  W(y) 
defined  by  (4),  has  to  be  modified.    Our  new  welfare  function  will  essentially  be  a 
discounted sum of period t (cardinal) utility levels, U
t(y1
t,y2
t), t = 0,1,... , where y1
t is the 
period  t  household  consumption  of  the  general  commodity  and  y2
t  is  the  period  t 
consumption  of  the  specific  commodity  whose  production  is  affected  by  the  R&D 
investment in period 0.  We will assume that the period utility functions U
t are of the no 
substitution Leontief type; i.e., we define U
t as follows: 
 
(51) U
t(y1,y2) ≡ min y’s {y1, y2/βt}   19 
 
where  βt  is  a  period  t  nonnegative
19 taste parameter;  i.e.,  the  bigger  βt  is,  the  more 
important will be the specific commodity to the consumer in period t.
20  Generally, we 
expect the sequence of βt parameters to decline over time as household tastes change and 
demand shifts away from the specific product until finally, for some period T > 1, the βt 
are all equal to 0 for t > T and for these distant future periods, the specific commodity is 
no longer demanded by any household. 
 
Turning now to the production side of the model, we assume that each commodity is 
produced by a single common input.  Let x1
t ≥ 0 and x2
t ≥ 0 denote the amounts of input 
used to produce the period t outputs y1
t ≥ 0 and y2
t ≥ 0 respectively.  If there is no R&D 
investment, then we assume that period t outputs and inputs are related by the following 




t ;  y2
t = a
0x2
t ;                                                                                             t ≥ 0 
 
where a
0 > 0 is the output input coefficient for sector 2.  Note that we have chosen units 
so that output equals input for the production of the general consumption commodity; i.e., 
in sector 1, output in period t, y1
t, is equal to the amount of input used during period t, x1
t. 
 
The total amount of input available to the economy in period t is x
t > 0 as in the previous 
sections.  Thus we have the following constraint in each period t on the allocation of 





t ;                                                                                                          t ≥ 0. 
 
We now work out the (anticipated) competitive allocation of resources between each of 
the two sectors for each period under the assumption that there is no R&D project.  Using 
definition (51) of the period t utility function U
t, it can be seen that if βt is positive, then 
we have the following relationships between the period t level of utility, u
t, and the period 







t/βt ;                                                                                           t ≥ 0, βt > 0.  
 
The above equations imply that the following equations hold: 
 
(55) y2
t = βt y1
t ;                                                                                                              t ≥ 0  
 
and it can be verified that equations (55) hold even if βt equals 0.  Substituting (52) and 
(55) into (53) leads to the following anticipated allocation of inputs for period t: 
 
                                                 
19 If βt = 0, then we define U
t(y1,y2) ≡ y1.  Thus if βt equals zero, then the specific commodity is no longer 
desired by the consumer in period t. 

















t for t = 0,1,2, ... .   20 
(56) x1












t ;                                                                                t ≥ 0. 
 
Substituting  (56)  and  (57)  into  (52)  gives  us  the  anticipated  production  of  each 
commodity in period t: 
 
(58) y1
t =   x1




t      =  u








t ;                                                                             t ≥ 0. 
 
We turn our attention to the prices that are anticipated to prevail in each period t.  We 
now assume that the central bank stabilizes the price of input w
t in each period and so we 
set w
t equal to unity for each t.  Given assumptions (52) on the technology of the sectors, 
the price of output 1 in period t, p1
t, will be equal to the period t price of input so we will 
have p1
t equal to one in each period as well.  For sector 2, we must have the period t 
value of outputs, p2
ty2
t, equal to the corresponding value of input, w
tx2
t = x2
t, and this 
equation  along  with  the  second  equation  in  (52)  will  imply  that  p2
t  will  equal  the 
reciprocal of a
0.  Putting this altogether, anticipated period t prices in the economy will be 
equal to the following specific values: 
 
(60) w
t = 1 ; p1
t = 1 ; p2
t = 1/a
0 ;                                                                                    t ≥ 0.   
 
We could use the above information in order to calculate the discounted stream of period 
t  utilities  and  this  would  lead  to  a  measure  of  (anticipated)  social  welfare  for  the 
economy; i.e., we could use the same social welfare function as was defined by (4) above 
except that period t utility u
t would replace our old period t consumption y
t.  However, 
we  will  find  it  more  convenient  to  measure  period  t  utility  by  period  t  household 
expenditure at constant prices; i.e., we will use money metric utility as our measure of 
period t utility.
21  Let E
t(u,p1,p2) be the expenditure function that is dual to the utility 
function U
t(y1,y2) that is defined by (51).  Then period t money metric utility e








t)                         for t = 0,1,2,... 




t                       where y1
t and y2
t are the period t household quantities 




t                       using (60) 
           = x1
t + x2
t                                using (58) and (59) 
           = x
t                                          using (53). 
 
Thus period t money metric utility (or expenditure) e
t is equal to period t aggregate input 
x
t, which is reasonable, given our assumptions of no technical progress in the economy 
and our pricing conventions, (60). 
 
Define the (anticipated) money metric level of social welfare, W
0, as discounted period by 
period money metric utility e
t: 
                                                 
21 The term money metric utility scaling is due to Samuelson (1974) but the idea of using an expenditure 







              = ∑t=0
∞ (1+r)
−tx
t                                                                                      using (61). 
 
Thus  for  our  base  case  where  there  is  no  R&D  investment  in  developing  a  new 
technology for sector 2, social welfare is equal to the discounted sum of period by period 
aggregate input availability for the economy. 
 
We now consider the case of a government R&D project that develops a new technology 
for  sector  2  in  period  0  and  is  made  freely  available  to  the  economy  in  subsequent 
periods.  We suppose that the period 0 government R&D expenditures on primary input 
are equal to the quantity of input z
0, which is assumed to be less than the available total 
primary input for period 0, x
0.  This R&D investment produces a new technology for 
sector  2  which  has  output  input  coefficient  a
1, where  as  usual,  we  assume  that  a








We  again  assume  (somewhat  unrealistically)  that  the  new  technology  immediately 
displaces the old technology used in sector 2 for all periods t greater than 0.  The algebra 
associated with equations (52)-(59) can now be repeated for all periods t ≥ 1, except that 
a
1 replaces a
0.  Letting xi
t* and yi
t* denote the quantity of input used by sector i and output 





t* ;  y2
t* = a
1x2




t ;                                                                                                      t ≥ 1; 
(66) y2
t* = βt y1
t* ;                                                                                                         t ≥ 1;  
(67) x1












t ;                                                                             t ≥ 1; 
(69) y1
t* =   x1




t      =  u








t ;                                                                         t ≥ 1. 
 
In  a  similar  manner,  we  obtain  the  following  counterparts  to  equations  (60);  i.e., 
anticipated period t prices in the economy after the R&D investment will be equal to the 
following specific values: 
 
(71) w
t* = 1 ; p1
t* = 1 ; p2
t* = 1/a
1 ;                                                                                t ≥ 1.   
    
Using  assumption  (63)  and  our  assumption  that  the  period  t  taste  parameter  βt  is 
nonnegative, we can establish the following inequalities:
22 
 
(72) [1 + (a
1)
−1βt]
−1 ≥ [1 + (a
0)
−1βt]
−1 ;                                                                          t ≥ 1. 
 
                                                 
22 If βt > 0, then inequality t in (72) holds strictly.   22 
Using (58), (59), (69), (70) and (72), it can be shown that the following relationships hold 
between the period t anticipated outputs with no R&D investment, yi
t, and the period t 
anticipated outputs with the period 0 R&D investment, yi




t ;                                                                                                   i = 1,2 ; t ≥ 1.   
  
It can also be shown that the two inequalities in (73) will hold strictly for any period t 
where the taste parameter βt is positive, so that the specific consumption commodity is 
demanded  in  that  period.  The  inequalities  (73)  make  good  intuitive  sense,  since  the 
increased  productivity  in  the  production  of  the  specific  commodity  affected  by  the 
process  innovation  allows  more  of  both  commodities  to  be  produced  for  any  period 
where the second commodity is actually demanded by households. 
 
We still need to calculate the period 0 allocation of resources between the two sectors 
after the R&D effort z
0 is subtracted off from total available primary input x
0 in period 0.  
If the required revenue to finance the government R&D project in period 0 is financed by 
an income tax in period 0, then the size of the required income tax t
0 is still equal to z
0/x
0, 
the same tax rate that was defined by (15) above.  The period 0 producer price for input 
will be w
0* ≡ 1 and the corresponding consumer price will be w
0*(1−t
0).  The producer 
and consumer prices for the two outputs in period 0 will be defined as follows: 
 
(74) p1




The  amounts  of  the  two  consumption  goods  that  will  be  produced  in  the  R&D 
equilibrium in period 0 turn out to be the following amounts: 
 
(75) y1












0] .   
 
We will find it convenient to define the monopolistic markup m that the new technology 
would allow if the technology were closely held by private investors (even though in the 
present case, the government makes the new technology freely available): 
 
(77) m ≡ [a
1/a
0] − 1 > 0 
 
where the inequality follows from assumption (63). 
 
We now calculate the value of consumption in each period for the new equilibrium, e
t*, 
but at the prices that prevailed in the equilibrium with no R&D investment.  For period 0, 

















0*                                                                       using (74) 












0]     using (75) and (76) 
              = x
0 − z
0.   23 
 
Thus  the  value  of  consumption  in  period  0  (valued  at  the  period  0  consumer  prices 
corresponding to the no R&D equilibrium prices pi
0 which turn out to equal the period 0 
consumer prices of the R&D equilibrium pi
0*), e
0*, is equal to the value of primary input 






0], where the equality follows since w
0* equals unity.  In a similar fashion, we calculate 
the period t money metric utility level e
t*, which is equal to the value of consumption in 









t)                                                                             t ≥ 1 









t*                                                                          using (60) 





t*                                                                       using (69) and (70) 
            = x1
t* + [1 + m]x2
t*                                                                       using (77) 
            = x
t + mx2
t*                                                                                   using (65). 
 
Thus  the  value  of  consumption  in  period  t  (valued  at  the  period  t  consumer  prices 
corresponding to the no R&D equilibrium prices pi
t), e
t*, is equal to the aggregate value 
of primary input that is available in period t, x
t, plus the imputed monopoly markup over 
the old technology that the new technology generates, m, times the amount of primary 
input that is allocated to the new technology in period t, x2
t*.  This is a rather nice result. 
 
We can use the above information in order to calculate an intertemporal money metric 
estimate of social welfare W
1 that the investment in the R&D project makes possible; i.e., 
define W
1 as the following discounted stream of  period t money metric utility levels e
t* 













t*]                                          using (78) and (79). 
 
Finally, the intertemporal money metric estimates of social welfare defined by (62) and 
(80) can be differenced in order to give us an estimate of the expected net benefits B of 
the government R&D project:
23 
 
(81) B ≡ W
1 − W
0 









t                  using (62) and (80) 










t*                                                      using (70) and (71). 
 
Expression (82) says that the net benefits of the R&D project are equal to the imputed 
monopolistic markup m times the discounted value of the input that is used by the new 
                                                 
23 It can be seen that the net benefit measure B is an intertemporal Hicksian equivalent variation; see Hicks 





24 less the amount of input that is allocated to the development of 
the new process in period 0, z
0.  Expression (83) provides an interpretation of the net 
benefits of the project in terms of outputs rather than inputs and is a counterpart to our 
earlier measure of net benefits B
* defined by (12).  Expression (83) says that the net 
benefits of the R&D project are equal to the imputed monopolistic markup m times the 





t*, less the amount of input that is allocated to the development of the new 
process in period 0, z
0, which in turn is equal to the value of the output of commodity 1 
that is foregone due to the R&D investment.  The measure of the net benefits of the 
project defined by (83) is very close to the partial equilibrium measure of the net benefits 
of a privately funded R&D project that was suggested by Diewert (2005b) (2005c).
25    
 
Obviously, we could go through various cases where the government funds the R&D 
project in various ways or we could look at the various cases where the private sector 
funds the R&D investment in our present more realistic model.  However, the results of 
analyzing all of these cases will be similar to the cases that we analyzed in sections 4 and 
5 above for our initial highly simplified model. 
 
There are considerable measurement problems associated with implementing the R&D 
measurement model defined by the net benefit measure (82).  It will generally be possible 
to  obtain  estimates  of  R&D  effort  in  the  current  period,  z
0,  and  it  will  be  generally 
possible to make somewhat realistic estimates of the appropriate real interest rate r or the 
discount factor 1/(1+r) but it will be very difficult to form estimates of the monopolistic 
markup factor m defined by (77)
26 or to form estimates of the amounts of input that the 
new technology will use in future periods. 
 
At this point, it is necessary to discuss some of the limitations of our present model.  We 
have allowed for obsolescence of the technology due to changing tastes.  However, there 
are other sources of obsolescence.  There are a number of factors that determine the rate 
of obsolescence for a newly developed technology: 
 
•  Competitors  develop  new  processes  or  products  that  erode  the  comparative 
advantage of the original new process or product. 
•  Tastes change, leading to changes in demand for the products that the new 
technology produces over time. 
•  Economic growth and nonunitary income elasticities change the demand for 
products over time; e.g., horses give way to bicycles which give way to motor 
                                                 
24 This summation of terms will be a finite one if βt = 0 for all t ≥ T. 
25 The main difference between our present measure defined by (83) and Diewert’s suggested measure is 
that Diewert allowed for an erosion of the monopoly markups over time.  However, it should be noted that 
Diewert’s partial equilibrium measure of the benefits of a privately funded project will usually understate 
the social benefits; see the discussion at the end of this section.   
26 More realistically, we need to form estimates of the future expected sequence of monopolistic markup 
factors; i.e., m is unlikely to be constant over the life of the project technology.  For a publicly funded R&D 
project where the technology is made freely available, it will be particularly difficult to form estimates of 
the  monopolistic  markup  m  or  equivalently,  of  the  output  input  coefficient  a
0  that  corresponds  to  the 
displaced old technology.   25 
bikes which in turn give way to automobiles which in turn, may give way to 
public transit! 
 
Of the three factors listed above, we have modeled only the second factor; i.e., we have 
introduced  exogenous  changes  in  tastes  that  cause  households  to  shift  their  demands 
away from the products that the new technology produces over time.  The third factor 
could be accommodated but as soon as nonhomothetic period preferences are introduced, 
it becomes necessary to distinguish rich and poor household groups and our model would 
become very complex indeed.
27   
 
In order to model the first factor listed above in the context of a privately developed 
innovation, we could imagine that in period t, competitors have developed a competing 
technology that is characterized by the output input coefficient a










1;                                                                                                        t > T
*. 
 
Thus for periods between 1 and T
*, the new technology that corresponds to the output 
input  coefficient  a
1  will  enjoy  a  monopolistic  advantage  with  the  imputed markup  in 
period t, m





t*] − 1 > 0 ;                                                                                  t = 1,2,...,T
*. 
 
Thus instead of assuming a constant markup m which lasts forever, we could assume that 
there will be a sequence of expected monopoly markups m
t which will eventually become 
0 after enough time has passed.  However, note that the social benefit of the process 
innovation is still given by (82) or (83); i.e., in this case, the private benefit derived by the 
monopolist will be less than the social benefit.  The difference between the social benefit 
of the innovation and the monopolist’s private benefit will show up as disembodied TPF 
growth!   
 
In addition to the above difficulties with the model presented in this section, we note 
some of the other important limitations of our analysis: 
 
•  Our  model  can  give  only  a  first  order  approximation  to  the  effects  of  an 
innovation; i.e., substitution effects, both on the consumer and producer sides of 
our model are absent.
28 
•  Our social welfare function is very simple and highly aggregated.  In particular, 
we did not distinguish how various segments of society would be affected by the 
innovation.  This limitation is particularly important when studying the effects of 
                                                 
27 If each household has identical homothetic period preferences, our assumption of a single representative 
consumer is justified.  
28 Consumer  substitution  effects  are  eliminated  because  of  our  assumption  of  Leontief  within  period 
preferences and the assumption of linear intertemporal preferences between periods.  Producer substitution 
effects are eliminated due to the high degree of aggregation in our producer production functions.   26 
a privately funded R&D project where the distribution of the gains generated by 
the project need not be spread evenly over all households in the economy. 
•  Our  model  assumed  that  the  new  technology  could  be  developed  in  a  single 
period.    In  fact,  many  innovations  (such  as  the  development  of  a  new  drug) 
require many years to develop.
29 
•  Our  model  assumed  that  the  new  technology  immediately  displaced  the 
incumbent  technology  when  in  fact,  the  old  technology  will  not  be  displaced 
immediately;  i.e.,  the  new  technology  will  only  gradually  diffuse  into  the 
economy.  
•  Our model assumed stable prices over time; i.e., we did not model how general 
inflation would affect accounting for the project.  
•  Due to the high degree of aggregation in our model, many index number problems 
were  suppressed;  e.g.,  how  exactly  should  the  deflator  for  R&D  effort  be 
constructed and how exactly should the monopolistic markup factor be defined 
when there are many inputs in the economy so that the new technology cannot be 




Many details remain to be worked out when we account for R&D investments.  We 
believe that the models presented in this paper may be particularly helpful in evaluating 
the benefits of publicly funded R&D projects, since this topic has proved to be very 
resistant to analysis. 
 
Some of the more important implications that emerge from our analysis are the following 
ones: 
 
•  The benefits of both privately and publicly funded R&D projects can only be 
evaluated in the context of an intertemporal general equilibrium model. 
•  In the case of a publicly funded project where the results of the project are made 
freely available, there are a large number of alternative ways that the government 
can  fund  the  project,  giving  rise  to  a  large  number  of  alternative  accounting 
treatments  of  the  R&D  investment.    In  our  highly  simplified  models,  these 
alternative methods for funding the project did not affect social welfare but in 
more  realistic  disaggregated  models,  the  alternative  methods  of  funding  will 
affect social welfare. 
•  In the case of a privately funded R&D project, the discounted stream of monopoly 
profits generated as a result of the project is a lower bound to the social benefits 
of the project.  In general, the social benefits will be considerably larger than the 
private benefits. 
•  We suggested that the costs of an R&D project should be amortized over time 
according  to  the  matching  principle  but  this  matching  will  inevitably  be 
somewhat arbitrary, both for private and publicly funded projects. 
                                                 
29 This limitation of our model is not too serious: we need only to cumulate the R&D expenditures over the 
development  periods  until  the  new  technology  is  being  used  in  production.    Note  that  each  period’s 
expenditures need to be carried forward at the rate given by one plus the interest rate.   27 
•  A  “correct”  accounting  treatment  of  an  R&D  project  will  lead  to  significant 
changes  to  the  traditional  Solow-Jorgenson-Griliches  growth  accounting 
paradigm.  The production accounts in the current System of National Accounts 
will also require significant modifications.  In particular, monopoly profits will 
have to be accommodated in a revised system of production accounts: an R&D 
“asset” is not at all like a depreciable capital stock asset.  
 
As  we  indicated  at  the  end  of  the  previous  section,  there  are  some  significant 
shortcomings in our modeling of the effects of an R&D project.  However, we have 
provided a start on the development of a reasonable methodology for the treatment of 
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